Penetration testing for a London payments company ahead of a banking partnership
Illustrative scenario. It shows how the National Front Corp. would run this engagement for a typical organization facing this challenge; it does not describe a specific client.
At a glance
- Organization
- A mid-sized London payments company
- Industry
- Financial services
- Market
- London, United Kingdom
- Services
- Penetration Testing, Vulnerability Management
- Published
- September 12, 2026
The situation
A London payments company, authorized by the Financial Conduct Authority, processes payments for online merchants through a web dashboard and a set of APIs. It is finalizing a partnership with a UK bank. Banks follow the Prudential Regulation Authority’s expectations on outsourcing and third-party risk management, so the bank’s review asks for recent independent penetration test results covering the platform the partnership will rely on. If the platform stores, processes or transmits card data, PCI DSS also requires penetration testing at least once a year and after significant changes.
The platform has grown quickly. New API versions, a partner integration and a move between cloud accounts have all happened within a short period, and the engineering team has not had an outside test since. Leadership wants evidence of where its controls hold, and time to fix what does not, before the bank looks.
How the engagement runs
- Exploratory meeting. Our pentest team learns what the bank is asking for, which systems are in play and what a bad outcome would look like, such as one merchant reading another merchant’s transactions or a payment being initiated without authorization.
- Write the rules of engagement. The scope covers the external perimeter, the merchant dashboard, the public and partner APIs and the cloud accounts behind them, with the hours, the permitted methods, the points of contact and the person who can stop the test. A retest of fixed findings is included. Nothing is tested before the rules are signed.
- Test and document. The testers work the agreed paths, with particular attention to authentication, the separation between merchants and roles, and the payment flows themselves. They record what is reached and from where, in enough detail to fix and not enough to serve as a manual.
- Deliver the fix order. The company receives an executive summary for leadership and the bank, a technical report with each finding rated by severity and backed by evidence, and a prioritized fix list. The testers walk the engineers through the results, and the report goes only to the people the company designates.
- Retest and close. Once the fixes are in place, a retest confirms which findings are closed. Every finding is tracked to closure through Vulnerability Management, with the company’s team or with the National Front Corp.
What the organization ends up with
The company ends up with clear evidence of where its controls hold and where they do not, from a penetration test run under written rules. The executive summary answers the bank’s question without exposing technical detail, and the engineers have a fix list ordered by what each finding exposed.
Leadership can go into the bank’s review knowing the scope of the test, its findings and the status of each fix, and can plan the next test after the next significant change. More on how National Front Corp. works in the region is on our London page.