Separating office IT and operational technology for a Houston midstream operator
Illustrative scenario. It shows how the National Front Corp. would run this engagement for a typical organization facing this challenge; it does not describe a specific client.
At a glance
- Organization
- A Houston-based midstream pipeline operator
- Industry
- Oil and gas midstream
- Market
- Houston, United States
- Services
- Security Architecture, Infrastructure Hardening
- Published
- June 24, 2026
The situation
A midstream operator headquartered in Houston runs gathering and transmission pipelines, compressor stations and a storage terminal, all monitored from a control room downtown. Its office IT and its operational technology were built by different teams at different times, and over the years they have grown together. An improvised program replicates data to office servers, engineering workstations sit on both networks, a few service accounts work everywhere, and several equipment vendors connect through remote-access tools set up for a single project and never removed.
Operators of pipelines designated critical by the TSA must follow security directives that require segmentation between IT and OT networks, access control, continuous monitoring and regular testing of their cybersecurity architecture. Whatever its designation, the operator knows that an incident on the office side could reach the systems that move product, and leadership wants a design it can explain to regulators, insurers and its own board.
How the engagement runs
- Exploratory meeting. Our cybersecurity team learns how the control room and field operations work day to day, what must be protected, and which constraints shape the design, from regulation to control equipment that cannot be patched or replaced quickly.
- Start from the environment as it is. With the operator’s IT and operations staff, the team maps every path between the two sides: data flows, shared accounts, dual-connected workstations and vendor access, including the paths that exist only because they were convenient.
- Design the secure zones and their boundaries. The target architecture groups systems into zones with defined conduits between them, following the zones-and-conduits approach of IEC 62443. Data the business needs from operations passes through a controlled exchange point between the two sides, and remote access goes through a single monitored entry point with multi-factor authentication.
- Design controls with owners. Each control is recorded in a control matrix with its purpose, its owner on the IT or operations side, the evidence it produces and what happens when it fails, so that the pipeline keeps running if the office network is lost.
- Hand it to implementation. The changes are sequenced into a roadmap around maintenance windows. The operator’s team applies them, or the National Front Corp.’s Infrastructure Hardening experts do, with the architects available throughout.
What the organization ends up with
The operator ends up with a documented security architecture: a secure system design, trust-boundary diagrams, an identity and access model for employees, field staff and vendors, and a control matrix in which every control has an owner. The roadmap turns the design into steps that each leave the pipeline systems running.
The control matrix also becomes the backbone of the evidence the operator shows regulators and auditors, so the design work is done once. More on how National Front Corp. works in the region is on the Houston page.